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There is a rich tradition in bioethics of gathering empirical data to inform, supplement, or test 
the implications of normative ethical analysis. To this end, bioethicists have drawn on diverse 
methods, including qualitative interviews, focus groups, ethnographic studies, and opinion 
surveys to advance understanding of key issues in bioethics. In so doing, they have developed 
strong ties with neighboring disciplines such as anthropology, history, law, and sociology. 
Collectively, these lines of research have flourished in the broader field of “empirical 
bioethics” for more than 30 years (Sugarman & Sulmasy 2010).   
More recently, philosophers from outside the field of bioethics have similarly employed 
empirical methods—drawn primarily from psychology, the cognitive sciences, economics, 
and related disciplines—to advance theoretical debates. This approach, which has come to be 
called experimental philosophy (or x-phi), relies primarily on controlled experiments to 
interrogate the concepts, intuitions, reasoning, implicit mental processes, and empirical 
assumptions about the mind that play a role in traditional philosophical arguments (Knobe et 
al. 2012). Within the moral domain, for example, experimental philosophy has begun to 
contribute to long-standing debates about the nature of moral judgment and reasoning; the 
sources of our moral emotions and biases; the qualities of a good person or a good life; and 
the psychological basis of moral theory itself (Alfano, Loeb, & Plakias 2018).  
We believe that experimental philosophical bioethics—or “bioxphi”—can similarly 
contribute to bioethical scholarship and debate.1 Here, we introduce this emerging discipline, 
explain how it is distinct from empirical bioethics more broadly construed, and attempt to 
characterize how it might advance theory and practice in this area.  
 
 
1 On October 4th and 5th, 2019, an international, interdisciplinary workshop on “experimental 
philosophical bioethics” was held at Yale University. One aim of the workshop was to produce a short 
position statement outlining the distinctive features of this emerging field (the meeting schedule and 
presentation abstracts showing representative new work are available at www.bioxphi.org). We are 
the workshop organizers and presenters, including experimental philosophers and moral psychologists 
engaged in research on bioethical topics, and (empirical) bioethicists interested in experimental 
philosophy and moral psychology. Some of the material in this statement has been adapted from Earp, 





What is experimental philosophical bioethics?  
In simplest terms, bioxphi is experimental moral philosophy as applied to topics in bioethics. 
It is thus a species of experimental philosophy. It is also a species of empirical bioethics: one 
which relies primarily on controlled experiments rather than descriptive studies to make 
sense of normatively charged phenomena of interest to bioethicists, with the aim of 
contributing to associated substantive debates. In this way, bioxphi aims not only to establish 
what people believe about matters of bioethical concern (for example, how various opinions, 
attitudes, or preferences are distributed in the general population or among specific 
stakeholders), but to uncover and explain why or how people arrive at certain normative 
beliefs, judgments, or decisions, largely by probing the relevant situational factors and 
proximate psychological mechanisms. 
For example, what do ordinary people take informed consent to require—and what cognitive 
processes and contextual cues contribute to judgments about whether such consent has in fact 
been given (Sommers forthcoming)? How do doctors determine what constitutes a harm or 
benefit when conflicting values are at stake, and what factors affect the weights they assign to 
each in terms of magnitude or importance (Earp and Shaw 2017)? When policymakers decide 
about fair distribution of resources, what shapes their intuitions about what justice demands? 
And how do proxy decision-makers characterize respect for persons in the face of contested 
intuitions about personhood, as in cases of fetuses or individuals with advanced dementia?  
By attempting to empirically address these and other similar questions, the long-term goal of 
bioxphi is to build cumulative, explanatory models of moral attitudes and behavior as these 
relate to bioethical issues, ideally grounded in nuanced, real-life examples. Insofar as 
abstract, theoretical principles or normative arguments emerge from bioxphi, they will 
hopefully be enriched by having been formulated or tested in a manner that takes into account 
the moral psychology of ordinary people.  
 
Some illustrative examples 
A common method in experimental philosophy is the so-called contrastive vignette technique 
(CVT), wherein certain stimuli or aspects of a situation are systematically manipulated to 
identify the particular factors and processes that shape moral concepts, intuitions, judgments, 
and decisions (Reiner 2019). Here, we share some illustrative examples of this technique in 





Consider an early bioxphi study by Jansen, Fogel, and Brubaker (2013). They asked a group 
of physicians to judge the intentions of a doctor who, depending on the experimental 
condition, was described as bringing about either a harmful or a helpful patient outcome as a 
consequence of enrolling them in a pharmaceutical trial. Consistent with classic work on the 
“side-effect effect” in experimental philosophy (Knobe 2003), participants judged the doctor 
to have behaved more intentionally with respect to the outcome when patients were harmed 
than when they were helped as a side-effect of participating in the study.  
 
More recently, Earp and colleagues (2019) used the CVT to study folk intuitions about 
perceived discontinuity in personal identity as a consequence of addiction. In this study, the 
characteristics of an agent and their drug of addiction were systematically manipulated across 
a set of vignettes. Participants were then asked to judge the extent to which the addicted agent 
was the “same person as” the agent prior to addiction. The researchers found that becoming 
addicted to a drug can lead to the strong impression that one is not the same person as before, 
and that this perception may be driven by perceived negative changes in the drug user’s 
moral character. This work builds on previous studies exploring the intuitive basis for 
judgments about altered identity in the context of neurodegeneration (Strohminger & 
Nichols, 2014; Tobia, 2016). Such studies in turn may be relevant to debates about, for 
example, the validity of advance directives.  
 
As a final example, Mihailov, Hannikainen and Rodríguez López (under review) described a 
series of agents who take cognitive enhancing medications while engaged in various 
competitive and non-competitive activities. Through the combined effects of effort and 
enhancement, each agent succeeds in their activity. Even though procedural fairness was 
stipulated across all cases, only participants who scored high on a baseline psychological 
measure of personal investment in fairness attributed the agent’s success more to the “pill” 
than to “skill” and judged the enhancement to be impermissible. These findings might 
suggest that concerns about fairness in the cognitive enhancement debate could depend in 
part upon the psychological attributes of the debater.  
 
Normative implications  
 
Given that bioxophi—in contrast to, say, moral psychology—is situated within bioethics, one 




can help in drawing normative moral conclusions. Within the broader field of empirical 
bioethics, a large number of complex methods have been employed toward this end. These 
include normative-empirical reflective equilibrium, grounded moral analysis, reflexive 
balancing (Davies, Ives, and Dunn 2015) and practical reflective equilibrium (Savulescu, 
Kahane and Gyngell 2019).  
  
Such strategies often take the context-specific moral judgments of stakeholders at face value 
to shape normative arguments or inform the future development of practice. A different 
approach, based on insights from experimental philosophy, is to trace the underlying sources 
of such moral judgments, treating them as objects of investigation in their own right. 
Depending on what is discovered about the situational factors or psychological processes 
involved in producing such judgments, their role in a given normative argument might be 
affirmed or called into question.  
  
In debates about palliative care for terminally ill patients, for example, it is sometimes argued 
that a high dose of pain medication that will foreseeably cause the patient’s death may 
nevertheless permissibly be administered if the doctor’s intention is to relieve suffering, but 
not if their intention is to cause death. Yet if judgments about what a doctor actually intended 
may be influenced by such factors as whether their actions led to a positive or negative 
outcome—as the study by Jansen et al. (2013) described earlier seems to suggest—this may 
require fresh thinking about how to determine whether such actions are indeed permissible on 
standard models.  
  
As another example, consider that a recurring objection to cognitive bioenhancement is that it 
is, in one way or another, unfair. In the previously mentioned study by Mihailov et al. (under 
review), it turned out that judgments about fairness were strongly influenced by participants’ 
individual psychological attributes, even when procedural fairness was explicitly not at issue 
in the vignettes used. One might think, then, that the normative force of such judgments, at 
least when procedural fairness has been accounted for, may deserve a more skeptical look in 
the context of objections to cognitive bioenhancement.  
  
In essence, the approach we are describing asks whether a given influence debunks or 
vindicates the relevant judgments, or their role in a normative argument (Kumar & May 




1.     Moral judgment M is mainly influenced by factor/process F/P. [empirical 
premise] 
2.     F/P is an unreliable (reliable) or morally irrelevant (relevant) factor/process. 
[normative premise] 
3.     So, moral judgment M is unjustified (vindicated/not defeated). 
  
Such a schema makes clear that a normative premise is still required to reach a normative 
conclusion. Yet experimental results derived from bioxphi studies, we claim, can provide 
crucial support for the empirical premise. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
A flourishing bioxphi movement envisages empirically-oriented philosophers and ethicists 
and normatively-minded clinicians and cognitive scientists coming together to study deep 
questions in bioethics. This is at heart, then, a collaborative project, which aims to integrate 
experimental study and normative analysis. In particular, the experimental approach can 
illuminate factors and processes underlying real-life bioethical judgments, which can in turn 
be assessed for their normative significance. By helping us understand why and how people 
make certain moral judgments, bioxphi aims to encourage a new perspective on traditional 
bioethical questions, affecting how these questions are studied, taught, and perhaps 
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